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The aim of this document is to provide a running record of ‘data harms’, harms that have 
been caused by uses of big data. The goal is to document and learn from where things have 
gone wrong. The document compiles the examples of harms that have been detailed in 
previous research and publications. Each listed example contains a link to the original source.  
 
The Data Harm Record pulls together concrete examples of harm that have been referenced 
in previous work so that we might gain a better ‘big picture’ appreciation of how people have 
already been negatively affected by uses of big data. A survey of harms also suggests where 
things may go wrong in the future and ideally stimulates more debate and interventions into 
where we may want to change course. The idea is that we can learn a lot by paying attention 
to where things have gone wrong and by considering data harms in relation to each other.  
 
Please note: This document records harms that have already happened. There is a great deal 
of research raising concerns about how harm may be caused in the future. Such work is 
incredibly important, but not a focus of this record.  
 
 
Background 
 
People working in business, government, politics and for non-profit organizations are all 
developing new ways to make use of big data. These bodies have always collected and 
analysed data, but what’s changed is the size, scope and methods to analyse data. The 
digitization of near everything along with major computing advances mean that it is now 
possible to combine sizes and types of data previously unimaginable, and to then analyse 
these staggering datasets in new ways to find patterns and make predictions. 
 
There is an abundance of enthusiasm and optimism about how big data can be used for 
good. Optimism persists for good reason, there is a lot of good that can be done through new 
uses of big data.1 There is also growing consensus that with big data comes risks to 
individuals and society. Previous work has detailed how data analytics can be used in ways 
that threaten privacy, security, as well as increase inequality and discrimination. The danger 
with big data is that harms can be caused unintentionally and intentionally. As argued by 
Cathy O’Neil , this is important to keep in mind as in many cases the algorithmic systems that 
are leading to harm were developed with very good intentions. The problem is that new big 
data tools present new ways to sort, profile, exclude, exploit, and discriminate. The 
complexity, opacity, and proprietary nature of many big data systems mean that often we 
don’t know things have gone wrong until after large numbers of people have been affected. 
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Another problem is that few people have the skills needed to interrogate and challenge these 
new big data systems. What recourse do citizens have if they have been wrongfully targeted, 
profiled, excluded or exploited? Government agencies, civil society organizations and 
researchers across disciplines are drawing attention to these risks.  
Defining data harms 
 
Dictionary definitions of harm link it to physical and material injuries, but also to potential 
injuries, damages and adverse effects.2 Solove and Citron argue that harm can be understood 
as ‘the impairment, or set back, of a person, entity, or society’s interests. People or entities 
suffer harm if they are in worse shape than they would be had the activity not occurred’.3  
 
Building on these definitions, one way to understand data harms is as the adverse effects 
caused by uses of data that may impair, injure, or set back a person, entity or society’s 
interests. While this definition is a start, clearly it is insufficient and will need to be developed 
given the increasing ubiquity of big data practices all around us.  
 
Our legal and political systems are struggling to come to terms with data harms. Across 
nations it is becoming easier for corporate and government bodies to share data internally 
and externally. New data about us is being generated by us and collected by others through 
new systems. Consider for example the range of data that can be generated and collected 
through the Internet of Things and also the range of harms that can be caused if the wrong 
people hack into industrial systems. Increasingly, our digital selves and the digitization of 
services affect the kind of lives we lead, the opportunities afforded to us, the services we can 
access and the ways we are treated. All of these developments present new types of risk and 
harm. For all of these reasons we need to develop a more complex understanding and 
appreciation of data harms and a means to assess current and future harms, from the 
perspective of people who are and may be negatively affected by these harms.  
 
Examples of data harms are detailed below. An attempt has been made at categorization, but 
in some cases the examples listed could fit in several categories simultaneously. 
	
	
	
Examples	
	
Commercial uses of data 
Potentials for exploitation 
Targeting based on perceived vulnerabil ity 
Some have drawn attention to how new tools make it possible to discriminate and socially 
sort with increasing precision. By combining multiple forms of data sets a lot can be learned.4 
Newman calls this ‘algorithmic profiling’ and raises concern about how much of this profiling 
is invisible as citizens are unaware of how data is collected about them across searches, 
transactions, site visits, movements, etc. This data can be used to profile and sort people into 
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marketing categories, some highly problematic. For example, data brokers combine data sets 
to identify specific groups. Much of this sorting goes under the radar. Some of it raises 
serious concerns. In her testimony to Congress, World Privacy Forum’s Pam Dixon reported 
finding brokers selling lists of rape victims, addresses of domestic violence shelters, sufferers 
of genetic diseases, sufferers of addiction and more. 
 
Another example, in 2015 the U.S. Federal Trade Commission ‘charged a data broker 
operation with illegally selling payday loan applicants’ financial information to a scam 
operation that took millions from consumers by debiting their bank accounts and charging 
their credit cards without their consent’.5 
 
 
When your personal information gets used against you  
Concerns have been raised about how credit card companies are using personal details like 
where someone shops or whether or not they have paid for marriage counselling to set rates 
and limits.6  This has been called ‘personalization’, or ‘behavioural analysis’ or ‘behavioural 
scoring’ and refers to companies tailoring things to people based on what is known about 
them. Croll notes that American Express used purchase history to adjust credit limits based 
on where customers shopped. Croll as well as Hurley and Adebayo , describe the case of one 
man who found his credit rating reduced from $10,800 to $3,800 in 2008 because American 
Express determined that ‘other customers who ha[d] used their card at establishments 
where [he] recently shopped have a poor repayment history with American Express’.7 This 
event, in 2008, was an early big data example of ‘creditworthiness by association’ and is 
linked to ongoing practices of determining value or trustworthiness by drawing on big data to 
make predictions about people.8 
 
Unintentional or intentional discrimination 
 
Discrimination -  skin colour,  ethnicity,  class or rel igion 
 
Credit Scoring 
As companies responsible for credit scoring, background checks, and hiring make more use of 
big data, an individual’s appearance, background, personal details, social network, or socio-
economic status may influence their ability to get housing, insurance, access education, or a 
job.  
 
There are new start-up companies that make use of a range of ‘alternative’ data points to 
make predictions about consumers and provide people with credit scores. In addition, 
traditional credit scoring agencies are making use of big data to develop profiles. While the 
argument is that these tools could open up the potential for some not served by traditional 
credit scoring systems to receive credit, there are a range of concerns about how algorithmic 
scoring may discriminate. For example, a consumer’s purchase history could be used, 
intentionally or unintentionally, as a proxy for ethnicity or religion. If an algorithmic system 
ends up penalizing one group more than others it may be hard to figure this out given the 
access issues, opacity and complexity of algorithmic processes. While there are laws in place 
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for people to review conventional credit scores, there are not yet measures in place for 
people to interrogate new big data generated scores.  
 
In relation to all of these examples, researchers have raised concerns about how new data 
driven processes reproduce illegal redlining practices. Historically, redlining was used to 
discriminate against certain groups of people by denying some groups access, or more 
expensive access, to housing or insurance. This was often done by ‘redlining’ certain 
communities. The issue is that where someone lives is often associated with ethnicity and 
class. In this way location facilitates racism and inequality. Critics are concerned about how 
new big data tools can be used to ‘redline’ given the amount of detail that can be determined 
about us through our data. Previous research has demonstrated the potential to accurately 
determine our age, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, religion and political views through the data 
that can be collected and combined about us.  
 
Relatedly, groups are raising concerns about how new data driven processes may facilitate 
‘reverse redlining’. This is when a particular group of people is targeted, as was done with 
sub-prime mortgages. Newman argues that big data was central to the subprime financial 
crash in 2007 as it played a key role in the manipulation of markets but also in the subprime 
mortgage industry. Online advertising and data collected about people online was used to 
direct and target them for sub-prime loans. In 2012 the American Department of Justice 
reached a settlement with the Wells Fargo Bank concerning allegations that it had ‘engaged 
in a pattern or practice of discrimination against qualified African-American and Hispanic 
borrowers in its mortgage lending from 2004 through 2009’ by pushing these borrowers into 
more costly sub-prime loans. In the settlement they agreed to provide $184 million in 
compensation.  
 
The practice of targeting low-income groups continues in the payday loan industry. A U.S. 
Senate Investigation reports that data brokers have been found selling lists that focus on 
citizen financial vulnerability. For example, data brokers have compiled the following lists to 
sell to those interested in targeting such groups: ‘Rural and Barely Making It’, ‘Ethnic Second-
City Strugglers’, ‘Retiring on Empty: Singles’, ‘Tough Start: Young Single Parents’. One 
company was found selling a marketing tool to ‘identify and more effectively market to 
under-banked consumers’.9	
 
As argued by Madden et al., the fact that those with low-incomes are less likely to take 
privacy protection measures when online and to also rely more on their mobile phone for 
online access places them at greater	risk than others for online targeting and exploitation.10 
In fact, ‘opting out’ of being tracked becomes increasingly difficult as technologies become 
more sophisticated. New tools that make cross-device tracking possible or that are 
embedded the Internet of Things, mean that the objects we use everyday make more of our 
lives ‘knowable’ and trackable and make ‘opting out’ even harder.11 Newman raises concerns 
about how in this age of big data, information inequality is transferred into economic 
inequality, as companies have more information about citizens that can be used to target and 
exploit them to their disadvantage.12  
 
Citron and Pasquale note that ‘evidence suggests that credit scoring does indeed have a 
negative disparate impact on traditionally disadvantaged groups’. They provide a number of 
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examples in their article, just one is the case of All-State which was challenged in court and 
agreed to a multi-million dollar settlement over their scoring procedure which plaintiffs 
argued ‘resulted in discriminatory action against approximately five million African-American 
and Hispanic customers’.13 They also raise concerns about how scoring systems and 
predictive tools may actually create the situations they claim to indicate and “take a life” of 
their own, for example by labelling someone a poor candidate or unemployable.14  
 
In 2015, Christian Haigh, a Harvard undergraduate, discovered that the prices for The 
Princeton Review’s online SAT tutoring packages offered to high school students varied 
depending on where customer’s live. Julia Angwin and Jeff Larson of ProPublica investigated 
Haigh’s findings and found that the highest prices were being offered to ZIP codes with a 
large Asian population and high median income. The Princeton Review said that the price 
difference was not intentional, but as noted by ProPublica, the pricing algorithm clearly did 
discriminate. Angwin and Larson note that it is significant that in the United States 
‘unintentional racial discrimination is illegal in housing and employment under the legal 
doctrine known as ‘disparate impact’ which prohibits inadvertent actions that hurt people in 
a protected class’. However this doctrine does not extend to the online world, making it 
difficult in that country (and others) to take legal action against ‘adverse impact’ caused by 
unintentional algorithmic bias. 
 
In 2012, a Wall Street Journal investigation found that Staples Inc. website displayed 
‘different prices to people after estimating their locations’ and that in what appeared to be 
an ‘unintended side effect’ Staples tended to show discounted prices to areas with a higher 
average income and higher prices to areas with lower average incomes.15  
 
A 2017 investigation by ProPublica and Consumer Reports showed that minority 
neighborhoods pay more for car insurance than white neighborhoods with the same risk 
levels. The study, which compared premiums and payouts in California, Illinois, Texas and 
Missouri, showed that minority neighborhoods paid ‘as much as 30 percent more than other 
areas with similar accident costs’. 
 
 
Facial recognition 
There are numerous reports of facial recognition systems that have problems identifying 
people who are not white. Algorithms that are used to focus smartphone cameras, for border 
security and advertisements sometimes cannot identify, or misidentify, someone who is not 
white. It has been reported that the problem is that the facial recognition algorithms used 
across various systems have been trained using datasets that have mostly white faces, that 
these algorithms have not been exposed to enough diversity and that this problem is also 
connected to the fact that many of these systems are being developed and tested largely by 
white people. As argued by Joy Buolamwini, the issue of bias and inaccuracy becomes 
increasingly important as facial recognition tools are adopted by police and security systems. 
Examples of problems include the New Zealand case where one man’s passport photograph 
was rejected when a facial recognition program mistakenly identified him as having closed 
eyes. People have posted reviews online raising questions about the ability of Microsoft’s 
Kinect facial recognition feature to recognize people with darker skin and of HP’s tracking 
webcams ‘to see black people’. 
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Discrimination – gender 
A study of Google ads found that men and women are being shown different job adverts, 
with men receiving ads for higher paying jobs more often.16 The study, which used a tool 
called AdFisher to set up hundreds of simulated user profiles, was designed to investigate the 
operation of Google’s ad settings. Although researchers could determine that men and 
women are being shown different ads, they could not determine why this is happening. 
Doing so would require access to more information that would need to be provided by 
advertisers about who they were targeting and by Google about how their system works. 
 
 
Discrimination -  health 
Cathy O’Neil has produced a great deal of work demonstrating how unfair and biased 
algorithmic processes can be. In one example, she tells the story of Kyle Behm, a high 
achieving university student who noticed that he was repeatedly not getting the minimum 
wage jobs he was applying for. All of these job applications required him to take personality 
tests which included questions about mental health. Although healthy when looking for work, 
Behm did suffer from bipolar disorder and had taken time out previously to get treatment. 
Behm’s father is a lawyer and he became suspicious of the fairness of these tests for hiring. 
He decided to investigate and found that a lot of companies were using personality tests, like 
the Kronos test. These tests are used as part of automated systems to sort through 
applications and in this process decide which applicants proceed and which are ‘red-lighted’ 
or discarded. As O’Neil details, these tests are often highly complex, with ‘certain patterns of 
responses’ disqualifying people. This example raises a number of ethical questions about the 
use of health information in automated systems but also about the uses of automated 
systems in hiring more generally, particularly as it is unlikely that those who have been ‘red-
lighted’ will ever know they were subject to an automated system.  O’Neil argues that the 
increasing use of automated systems to sort and whittle down job applications creates more 
unfairness as those who know or can pay for help to ensure their applications get to the top 
of the pile have an advantage. 
 
 
Loss of privacy 
This can happen unintentionally when attempts to release data anonymously do not work. 
Big data makes anonymity difficult because it is possible to re-identify data that has been 
anonymized by combining multiple data points. 
 
AOL Example 
As detailed by Paul Ohm, in 2006 America Online (AOL) launched ‘AOL Research’ to ‘embrace 
the vision of an open research community’. The initiative involved publicly releasing twenty 
million search queries from 650,000 users of AOL’s search engine. The data, which 
represented three months of activity, was posted to a public website. Although the data was 
anonymized, once the data was posted some users demonstrated that it was possible to 
identify people’s identities using the data which included name, age and address. 
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Two New York Times reporters Michael Barbaro and Tom Zeller Jr. cross-linked data to 
identify Thelma Arnold, a sixty-two year old widow from Lilburn Georgia. Her case 
demonstrates the problems with ‘anonymisation’ in an age of big data, but also the danger in 
reading too much into search queries. As Barbaro and Zeller note, Ms Arnold’s search queries 
‘hand tremors’, ‘nicotine effects on the body’, ‘dry mouth’ and ‘bipolar’, could lead someone 
to think she suffered from a range of health issues. Such a conclusion could have negative 
effects if the organization making that conclusion was her insurance provider. In fact, when 
they interviewed Arnold, Barbaro and Zeller found that Arnold often does searches for her 
friends because she wants to help them. 
 
Netflix Example 
In 2006 Netflix publicly released one hundred million records detailing the film ratings of 
500,000 of its users between Dec. 1999 and Dec. 2005. As Ohm reports, the objective was to 
launch a competition and for those competing to use this data to improve Netflix’s 
recommendation algorithm.17 Netflix anonymized the data by assigning users a unique 
identifier. Researchers from the University of Texas demonstrated not long after this release 
how relatively easy it was for people to be re-identified with the data.18 This led to a court 
case in which Jane Doe argued that the data could be used to out her sexuality.19 Jane Doe 
argued that her homosexuality was being revealed by the data as it revealed her interest in 
gay and lesbian themed films. She argued the data outed her, a lesbian mother, against her 
wishes and could damage herself and her family. The court case was covered by Wired in 
2009. 
 
Identity theft, blackmail, reputational damage, distress 
Data breaches 
Although data breaches are listed under corporate uses of data, they could also be listed 
here under government uses of data as breaches have happened in both sectors. Solove and 
Citron argue that ‘harm’ in relation to data breaches relates to ‘a risk of future injury, such as 
identity theft, fraud, or damaged reputations’ and also to a current injury as people 
experience anxiety about this future risk. They note that the anxiety and emotional distress 
created about future risk is a harm that people experience ‘in the here and now’. Identity 
theft is a major problem, particularly for those of low-income who lack the resources to pay 
for legal representation and challenge mistakes due to identity fraud. Further, the sudden 
loss of income or errors that result from identity fraud can be disastrous for those living from 
pay cheque to pay cheque. Sarah Dranoff notes that in addition to financial loss, identity theft 
can lead to ‘wrongful arrests, loss of utility service, erroneous information on health records, 
improper child support garnishments, and harassment by collection agencies’.20 A number of 
data breach examples are detailed by Solove and Citron: 1) The Office of Policy Management 
breach leaked people’s fingerprints, background check information, and analysis of security 
risks, 2) The Ashley Madison breach released information about people’s extramarital affairs, 
3) The Target breach resulted in leaking credit card information, bank account numbers and 
other financial data and 4) the Sony breach involved employee email. 
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Physical injury 
Esther Kaplan’s investigation into the effects of workplace data monitoring revealed how the 
monitoring of employees in order to increase their productivity is leading to physical injury in 
some cases. She interviewed a UPS worker who noted that the physical demands of his job 
have increased since the company introduced a telematics system. The system monitors 
employees in real time through tracking devices that include ‘delivery information acquisition 
devices’ and sensors on delivery trucks. The pressure to do more work in less time is leading 
to injury as drivers do not have the time to lift and carry packages properly.21 
 
Political uses of Data 
Political Manipulation and social harm 
The damage that can be done by fake news, bots and filter bubbles have generated much 
discussion recently. Uses of big data and algorithmic processes in these cases can lead to 
social and political harm as the information that informs citizens is manipulated, potentially 
leading to misinformation and undermining democratic and political processes as well as 
social well-being. A recent study by researchers at the Oxford Internet Institute details the 
diverse ways that people are trying to use social media to manipulate public opinion across 
nine countries. They note that this is a concern given the increasing role that social media 
plays as a key information source for citizens, particularly young people. Further, that social 
media are fundamental in many countries to the sharing of political information.  Civil society 
groups are ‘trying, but struggling, to protect themselves and respond to active 
misinformation campaigns’.  
 
Woolley and Howard define computational propaganda as involving ‘learning from and 
mimicking real people so as to manipulate public opinion across a diverse range of platforms 
and device networks’. Bots, automated programs, are used to spread computational 
propaganda. While bots can be used for legitimate functions, the Internet Institute study 
details how bots can be used to spam, harass, silence opponents, ‘give the illusion of large-
scale consensus’, sway votes, defame critics, and spread disinformation campaigns. The 
authors argue that ‘computational propaganda is one of the most powerful new tools against 
democracy’. 
	
Government uses of Data 
Data Errors 
Big data blacklisting and watch-lists in the U.S. have wrongfully identified individuals. As 
detailed by Margaret Hu, being wrongfully identified in this case can negatively affect 
employment, ability to travel, and in some cases lead to wrongful detention and 
deportation.22  
 
9	
	
Hu details the problems with the American E-Verify programme, which ‘attempts to “verify” 
the identity or citizenship of a worker based upon complex statistical algorithms and multiple 
databases’. Employers across states use the programme to determine if a person is legally 
able to work in the U.S. Hu writes that it appears that employers have wrongfully denied 
employment for thousands. Hu argues that e-verify is problematic due to the unreliability of 
the data that informs the database screening protocol. The problems with the e-verify 
programme have also been detailed by Upturn. A study by the American Civil Liberties Union 
demonstrates that errors are far more likely to affect foreign-born employees and citizens 
with foreign names. People with multiple surnames and women who change their names 
after marriage are also more likely to face errors. Harm is further exacerbated by the 
difficulty in challenging or correcting e-verify errors. As discussed by Alex Rosenblat and 
others: ‘[L]ow-wage, hourly workers, whether they are flagged for a spelling error or for 
other reasons, often lack the time, resources, or legal literacy required to navigate complex 
bureaucracies to correct misinformation about them in a national database’. 
 
Hu also raises concerns about The Prioritised Enforcement Programme (PEP), formerly the 
Secure Communities Programme (S-COMM). This is a data-sharing programme between the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), DHS and local law enforcement agencies that requires 
local agencies to run fingerprints taken from suspects against federal fingerprint databases 
(ibid: 1770). The programme has made errors. For example, inaccurate database screening 
results wrongfully targeted 5,880 US citizens for potential detention and deportation, leading 
critics to question the reliability of PEP/S-COMM’s algorithms and data. Furthermore, by 
using the biometric data of arrestees contained in the S-COMM databases the Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) reportedly may have wrongly apprehended approximately 
3,600 US citizens, due to faulty information feeding database screening protocols. As Hu 
points out, ‘error-prone’ databases and screening protocols ‘appear to facilitate the unlawful 
detention and deportation of US citizens’.  
 
Hu argues that the big data systems underlying both E-Verify and S-COMM/PEP are causing 
harm by mistakenly targeting and assigning inferential guilt to individuals. Legally speaking, 
this kind of digitally generated suspicion is at odds with constitutional rights and there is a 
growing consensus, at least in the U.S, on the need for substantive and binding due process 
when it comes to big data governance.  
 
In Australia, the Ombudsman and Senate launched investigations into the Government’s 
automated debt recovery system after numerous complaints of errors and unfair targeting of 
vulnerable people. The system uses data matching to determine if people have been 
overpaid their benefits. Onus was placed on those receiving letters to prove an error had 
been made.  
 
Numerous accounts of errors were published in the press and calls for investigation were 
taken up by opposition politicians. One case involved a man who was repeatedly sent letters 
saying he owed the government repayment of $4,000. This turned out to be an error. The 
man, who suffers from depression and became suicidal, said he successfully convinced the 
government this was an error only to receive a similar letter a few months later. He again 
successfully proved this was an error. One of the ombudsman’s conclusions was that better 
project planning and risk management should have been done from the outset.   
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Cassandra Goldie, Chief Executive of the Australian Council of Social Service, was quoted in 
the Guardian as saying: 
[R]obo-debt has issued thousands of debt notices in error to parents, people with 
disabilities, carers and those seeking paid work, resulting in people slapped with 
Centrelink debts they do not owe or debts higher than what they owe … It has been a 
devastating abuse of government power that has caused extensive harm, particularly 
among people who are the most vulnerable in our community. 
 
Other examples of failure include attempts to automate welfare services in the U.S. Virginia 
Eubanks details the system failures that devastated the lives of many in Indiana, Florida and 
Texas at great cost to taxpayers. The automated system errors led to people losing access to 
their Medicaid, food stamps and benefits. The changes made to the system led to crisis, 
hospitalization and as Eubanks reports, death. These states cancelled their contracts and 
were then sued.   
 
Data Errors – small  data 
Big data applications used by governments rely on combining multiple data sets. As noted by 
Logan and Ferguson, ‘small data (i.e. individual level discrete data points) … provides the 
building blocks for all data-driven systems’. The accuracy of big data applications will be 
affected by the accuracy of small data. We already know there are issues with government 
data, just two examples: 1) in the United States, in 2011 the Los Angeles Times reported that 
nearly 1500 people were unlawfully arrested in the previous five years due to invalid 
warrants and 2) in New York, a Legal Action Center study of rap sheet records ‘found that 
sixty-two percent contained at least one significant error and that thirty-two percent 
contained multiple errors’. 23  
 
Harms due to algorithm / machine bias 
Research into predictive policing and predictive sentencing shows the potential to over-
monitor and criminalize marginalized communities and the poor.24  
 
Journalists working with ProPublica are investigating algorithmic injustice. Their article titled 
‘Machine Bias’ in particular, has received a great deal of attention. Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, 
Surya Mattu and Lauren Kirchner’s investigation was a response to concerns being raised by 
various communities about judicial processes of risk assessment. These processes of risk 
assessment involved computer programs that produce scores predicting the likelihood that 
people charged with crimes would commit future crimes. These scores are being integrated 
throughout the US criminal justice system and influencing decisions about bond amounts and 
sentencing. The ProPublica journalists looked at the risk scores assigned to 7,000 people and 
checked to see how many were charged with new crimes. They found that the scores were 
‘remarkably unreliable in forecasting violent crime’. They found that only 61%, just over half, 
of those predicted to commit future crimes did. But the big issue is bias. They found that the 
system was much more likely to flag black defendants as future criminals, wrongly labelling 
them as future criminals at twice the rate as white defendants. White people were also 
wrongly labelled as low risk more often than black defendants. The challenge is that these 
risk scores and the algorithm that determines them is produced by a for profit company, so 
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researchers were not able to interrogate the algorithm only the outcomes. ProPublica 
reports that the software is one of the most widely used tools in the country. 
 
Kristian Lum and William Isaac, of the Human Rights Data Analysis Group, recently published 
an article detailing bias in predictive policing. They note that because predictive policing tools 
rely on historical data, predictive policing should be understood as predicting where police 
are likely to make arrests and not necessarily where crime is happening. As noted by Lum and 
Isaac, as well as by O’Neil, if nuisance crimes like vagrancy are added to these models this 
further complicates matters and there is an over policing of poor communities, more arrests, 
and you have a feedback loop of injustice. Lum and Isaac used a range of data sources to 
produce an estimate of illicit drug use from non-criminal justice, population based data 
sources which they then compared to police records. They found that while drug arrests tend 
to happen in non-white low income communities, drug crimes are more evenly distributed 
across the community. Using one of the most popular predictive policing tools, they find that 
the tool targets black people twice as much as whites even though their data on drug use 
shows that drug use is roughly equivalent across racial classifications. Similarly they find that 
low income households are targeted by police at much higher rates than higher income 
households. 
 
O’Neil describes how crime prediction software, as used by the police in Pennsylvania leads 
to a biased feedback loop. In this case the police include nuisance crimes, such as vagrancy, 
in their prediction model. The inclusion of nuisance crimes, or so-called antisocial behaviour, 
in a model that predicts where future crimes will occur distorts the analysis and ‘creates a 
pernicious feedback loop’ by drawing more police into the areas where there is likely to be 
vagrancy. This leads to more punishment and recorded crimes in these areas, poor areas 
where there is likely to be vagrancy. O’Neil draws attention to specific examples of problems: 
Pennsylvania police use of PredPol, the NYCPD use of CompStat and the Philadelphia police 
use of Hunchlab.25 
 
 
How	can	harms	be	prevented?	
 
Ultimately the goal of this Data Harm Record is to stimulate more debate and critical 
interrogation of how big data is being used across sectors and areas of life. 
 
The goal is to maintain the Data Harm Record as a running record. Please let us know of any 
cases you think we should add by sending a message here. 
 
It is hoped that this work contributes to the work of others in this area, many referenced in 
this publication, who are trying help us gain a better appreciation of: a) how uses of big data 
are affecting people, b) the kind of datafied world we are creating and experiencing, c) the 
fact that in this world big data practices affect people differently, and d) how datafication is 
political and may lead to practices that intentionally or unintentionally discriminate, be 
unfair, and increase inequality.  
 
There are a range of individuals and groups coming together to develop ideas about how 
data harms can be prevented.26 Researchers, civil society organizations, government bodies 
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and activists have all, in different ways, identified the need for greater transparency, 
accountability, systems of oversight and due process, and the means for citizens to 
interrogate and intervene in the big data processes that affect them. It is hoped that this 
record demonstrates the urgent need for more public debate and attention to developing 
systems of transparency, accountability, oversight and citizen intervention. For example, 
O’Neil argues that auditing should be done across the stages of big data projects and include 
auditing: the integrity of the data; the terms being used; definitions of success; the accuracy 
of models; who the models fail; the long-term effects of the algorithms being used; and the 
feedback loops created through new big data applications. Others, like AI Now, note the need 
for greater involvement with civil society groups, particularly groups advocating for social 
justice who have long-standing experience identifying and challenging the biases embedded 
in social systems. Researchers at AI Now have argued that government uses of automated 
and artificial intelligence systems in the delivery of core services in criminal justice, 
healthcare, welfare and education should stop until the risks and harms can be fully assessed.  
 
Accompanying a record of data harms, should be a record of data for good that can be used 
to provide ideas of how to use data in ways that do no harm. Here there are important 
examples to follow. The Council for Big Data, Ethics, and Society has been releasing case 
studies that detail how ethical concerns have been managed. Building on this idea, it would 
be good to develop a record of where and how groups and individuals set out to prevent data 
harms from the outset. 
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